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I; a f;uf !o three decision, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that evidence of the 
defendant's pre-arrest silence· in 
the presence of police officers was 
properly admitted as a tacit 
admission. Key-El v. State, 349 
Md. 811, 709 A.2d 1305 (1998). 
In so holdirig, the court determined 
that the admission of such 
evidence did· not violate the 
defendant's Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination. 
On August 19, 1994, police 
responded to a 911 call made by 
Mrs. Key-El from the home she 
shared with her husband ("the 
defendant"). When the police 
officers arrived to question her 
concerning the incident, Mrs. 
Key-El was crying. She responded 
that the defendant had pulled her 
hair and punched her in the face, 
bruising her left eye during an 
argument. Although the defendant 
was only a few feet away from 
Mrs. Key-El and able to hear her 
stating these accusations to the 
officers, he remained silent. 
In a letter to the Office of the 
State's Attorney following the 
incident, Mrs. Key-El restated the 
accusations against the defendant. 
At trial, however, Mrs. Key-El 
changed her story and stated that 
she had been struck by the 
defendant's girlfriend after she 
found the two together. Mrs. 
Key-El testified that the reason she 
initially had accused the defendant 
of hitting her was because she was 
upset and wanted him to suffer. 
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At trial, the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore County allowed 
testimony as to the defendant's 
pre-arrest silence. A jury 
convicted the defendant of battery 
and sentenced him to five years 
imprisonment. The Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland 
affirmed the circuit court's 
decision. The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland then granted certiorari to 
decide whether the circuit court 
had abused its discretion in 
admitting into evidence the 
defendant's pre-arrest silence. 
The defendant raised the 
following two issues to the court 
of appeals: (1) whether the 
evidence of the defendant's 
pre-arrest silence in the presence 
of a police officer was admissible; 
and (2) whether this evidence, if 
deemed admissible, infringed upon 
his Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination. Key-El, 349 
Md. at 815, 709 A.2d at 1306. In 
addressing the first issue, the court 
noted that tacit admissions by a 
party-opponent in both civil and 
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criminal actions have long been 
recognized by Maryland courts as 
an exception to the hearsay rule 
under the common law. Id at 816, 
709 A.2d at 1307. 
The three elements that must 
be satisfied in order for silence to 
be considered a tacit admission 
are: (1) the accused heard and 
understood the accusation; (2) at 
the time, the accused had the 
chance to respond; and (3) under 
the circumstances, a reasonable 
person in the position of the 
accused would have voiced a 
response. Id. at 817, 709 A.2d at 
1307 (quoting Henry v. State, 324 
Md. 204, 241-42, 596 A.2d 1024, 
1 043 (1991)). The court held that 
the defendant's silence met these 
criteria. Id. at 818-19, 709 A.2d at 
1308. 
The defendant, however, 
contended that his silence was too 
ambiguous to be considered a tacit 
admission and as such, was only of 
minimal probative value. Id. at 
817, 709 A.2d at 1307. The 
defendant further contended that 
evidence of his silence was unduly 
prejudicial and violated his right to 
remain silent. Id. Therefore, the 
trial court erred in allowing it into 
evidence. Id. The United States 
Supreme Court, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland, and the 
Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland have all addressed the 
issue of placing limits upon the 
usage of a defendant's silence as 
evidence in distinguishing between 
pre-arrest and post-arrest silence. 
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Id. at 817-18, 709 A.2d at 
1307-08. Generally, courts have 
held that pre-arrest silence is 
admissible and does not violate a 
defendant's constitutional rights; 
whereas, post-arrest silence, 
specifically after a defendant has 
been read his Miranda rights, 
violates a defendant's 
constitutional rights and is not 
admissible. Id. (citations omitted). 
The most applicable 
Maryland case is Williams v. State, 
4 Md. App. 342, 242 A.2d 813 
(1968), in which the court of 
special appeals held that a 
defendant's silence, in the face of 
an accusation by a third party in 
the presence of a police officer, 
was admissible as evidence of a 
tacit admission. Key-El, 349 Md. 
at 818, 709 A.2d at 1308. 
Therefore, the court concluded that 
the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in allowing the 
defendant's silence as a tacit 
admission into evidence. Id. at 
820, 709 A.2d at 1309. 
The court then addressed the 
issue of whether the defendant's 
Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination was violated by 
the admission of his pre-arrest 
silence. Id. at 820-21, 709 A.2d at 
1309. In addressing the 
defendant's claim, the court turned 
to Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 
231 (1980), in which the United 
States Supreme Court held that the 
use of a defendant's pre-arrest 
silence to impeach his testimony at 
trial did not improperly burden his 
Fifth Amendment right to remain 
silent. Key-El, 349 Md. at 822, 
709 A.2d at 1310. Justice Stevens, 
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in his concurring opinion in 
Jenkins wrote, '" [w ]hen a citizen is 
under no official compulsion 
whatever, whether to speak or to 
remain silent, I see no reason why 
his voluntary decision to do one or 
the other should raise any issue 
under the Fifth Amendment. '" Id. 
at 824, 709 A.2d at 1311 (quoting 
Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 243-44). 
The court of appeals, 
applying Justice Stevens' logic, 
found that although police officers 
were present, the defendant had 
not been arrested and "was under 
no official compulsion to speak or 
remain silent." Id. at 825, 709 
A.2d at 1311. Therefore, 
inferences of guilt could be made 
from his silence and use of those 
inferences as evidence did not 
violate his Fifth Amendment 
rights. Id. 
Judge Raker, joined by Chief 
Judge Bell and Judge Eldridge, 
dissented, arguing that the 
defendant's tacit admission in the 
presence of police officers was too 
ambiguous. Id. Such evidence 
should not be admissible because 
the defendant may have believed 
he was exercising his "right to 
remain silent." Id. Additionally, 
the dissent was concerned that the 
admission was used as substantive 
evidence, not simply as evidence 
used to impeach the defendant. Id. 
A critical aspect of the present case 
that influenced the dissent's 
opinion was the presence of law 
enforcement officers during the 
defendant's silence. Id. at 828-30, 
709 A.2d at 1313-14. The dissent 
pointed out that "the accused 
might well remain silent because 
. . . he thinks he has the right to 
remain silent that the mass media 
have so well publicized." Id. at 
830, 709 A.2d at 1314. Therefore, 
the dissent argued that pre-arrest 
silence in the presence of police 
officers should not be admitted 
into evidence as a tacit admission. 
Id. at 833, 709 A.2d at 1315. 
In Key-El v. State, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland held that 
the defendant's pre-arrest silence 
in the presence of police officers 
may be admitted into evidence as a 
tacit admission without violating 
the defendant's Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination. 
Therefore, if a person is accused of 
a crime and has not yet been 
arrested, it may be in the person's 
best interest to respond to the 
accusation instead of simply 
remaining silent. The court's 
decision is sound under Maryland 
law and comports with the rules of 
evidence. However, as the dissent 
pointed out, it is logical to think 
that what you do not say cannot 
hurt you. A fundamental concept 
of the American legal system is 
that the burden of proving a 
defendant's guilt lies with the 
prosecution. With this ruling we 
are telling suspects that they are 
not considered innocent until 
proven guilty if they remain silent 
in the face of an accusation. 
Additionally, in an already heated 
moment, this could create a 
dangerous situation for police 
officers. It is easier for police 
officers to control a situation if the 
parties are calm and not engaging 
in excited exchanges. As a matter 
of personal liberty and public 
order, a person should be 
encouraged to remain silent and 
calm. Despite this, the court chose 
a rigid adherence to precedent 
rather than a pragmatic view of 
such situations. 
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